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Abstract—Online advertising, the pillar of the “free” content
on the Web, has revolutionized the marketing business in recent
years by creating a myriad of new opportunities for advertisers
to reach potential customers. The current advertising model
builds upon an intricate infrastructure composed of a variety
of intermediary entities and technologies whose main aim is to
deliver personalized ads. For this purpose, a wealth of user data
is collected, aggregated, processed and traded behind the scenes
at an unprecedented rate. Despite the enormous value of online
advertising, however, the intrusiveness and ubiquity of these prac-
tices prompt serious privacy concerns. This article surveys the
online advertising infrastructure and its supporting technologies,
and presents a thorough overview of the underlying privacy risks
and the solutions that may mitigate them. We first analyze the
threats and potential privacy attackers in this scenario of online
advertising. In particular, we examine the main components of
the advertising infrastructure in terms of tracking capabilities,
data collection, aggregation level and privacy risk, and overview
the tracking and data-sharing technologies employed by these
components. Then, we conduct a comprehensive survey of the
most relevant privacy mechanisms, and classify and compare
them on the basis of their privacy guarantees and impact on the
Web.
Index Terms—online advertising, Web tracking, user profiling,
privacy risks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Selecting and directing information are crucial in every aspect
of our modern lives, including areas as diverse as health,
leisure and research. In the past, these processes were largely
manual, but due to the exponential improvements in com-
putation and sophistication of software, they are becoming
increasingly automated.
The industry of online advertising, lavishly illustrated by
Google DoubleClick and real-time bidding (RTB), is an ex-
ample of the ever-growing automation of these processes, and
another crucial aspect of our society — to a large extent, the
success of most competitive economic activities is dependent
on advertising, particularly on the ability to effectively select
and direct information to the right potential customers.
Undoubtedly, the advent of the Internet and the Web has
created a myriad of new opportunities for advertisers to target
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Fig. 1: Word cloud of terms related to online advertising, tracking, user
profiling, and privacy solutions in this scenario. We discuss all these terms in
this work. The font size of each of them is proportional to the frequency of
occurrence in Google search.
billions of people almost effortlessly. However, online adver-
tising is not only ubiquitous. In the early days of the Web, ads
were served directly by the publisher (i.e., the page’s owner)
following a one-size-fits-all approach. But due to the ease
with which Web users can be tracked across their page visits,
online advertising has also become increasingly personalized.
An example of the sophistication of ad personalization is RTB,
which enables advertisers to direct ads to the right user and
at the right time, by competing in real-time auctions for the
impression of their ads [1].
Evidently, personalized advertising is the most effective, and
hence the most profitable, form of advertising. According to
a recent survey, those ads relying on a user’s browsing inter-
ests ensure conversion rates1 that double those of untargeted
ads [2]. On the other hand, from the publishers’ perspective,
online advertising is the pillar that sustains the Internet’s “free”
content and services.
Nevertheless, advertisers and publishers are not the only
entities taking part in this business. In fact, there exists an
entire infrastructure at the service of both of them, supported
by companies like Google, Facebook and Twitter. Enabled by
these and hundreds of other ad companies, targeting mecha-
nisms take charge of selecting and directing ads to billions of
users everyday, depending on a number of factors such as the
page they are visiting; their browsing history; their IP address
or parts of it; their operating system; the plug-ins installed and
other information related to their Web browser [3], [4], [5];
and obviously the objectives and budgets of all advertisers for
displaying their ads.
User information is therefore an asset fundamental to the
efficient and effective delivery of advertising, which is not
1In online marketing terminology, conversion usually means the act of
converting Web site visitors into paying customers.
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2only handed over to the highest bidder, but to many other
third parties that are involved in the ad-delivery process.
Unfortunately, evident security risks exist for users when
personal, sensitive data about their habits are traded in the
name of personalized advertising by an infrastructure that
operates in the shadows with virtually no oversight [6]. These
security risks can be explained in terms of privacy hazards,
social sorting, discrimination, malware distribution, fraud and
others [7] [8] [9].
Regarding privacy, serious concerns have been raised by
the intrusiveness of practices and the increasing invasiveness
of digital advertising. According to recent surveys, two out of
three Internet users are worried about the fact that their online
behavior be scrutinized without their knowledge and consent.
Numerous studies in this same line reflect the growing level
of ubiquity and abuse of advertising, which is perceived by
users as a significant degradation of their browsing experi-
ence [10] [11] [12].
In an attempt to mitigate these privacy and security risks,
several approaches have been proposed by a heterogeneous
group of actors. Research proposals have concentrated on so-
phisticated mechanisms to anonymize or block the information
leaked to third-parties while trying to remain compatible with
the current ecosystem. On the other hand, commercial solu-
tions have primarily focused on blocking tracking mechanisms
at the cost of seriously damaging the Internet business model.
A. Contribution and Plan of this Paper
This paper presents a “big picture” of the current state-of-the-
art of academic and industry solutions that aim at protecting
Web users from various privacy threats posed by the online
advertising industry. We begin by introducing the main actors
of this infrastructure, the interactions among them, and the
technologies enabling the delivery of ads. Our survey of online
advertising provides the reader with the necessary depth to
understand the intricate dynamics of the current advertising
ecosystem, and the privacy risks users are exposed to.
To illustrate the risks posed by online advertising, this article
conducts a thorough characterization of the capabilities of the
components involved in the ad-delivery process, in terms of
type and scope of data collection, aggregation level, and, ac-
cordingly, privacy threat. This characterization constitutes the
first attempt to define an adversary model that systematically
classifies and analyzes the elements of the online advertising
architecture.
Having identified the privacy risks inherent to online adver-
tising, our second contribution is a comprehensive overview
of the protection mechanisms that may cope with such threats.
These mechanisms are examined, among other aspects, on the
basis of the location of the mechanism employed, the scope
of its application and its protection strategy. A significant
part of our analysis is devoted to those privacy mechanisms
that operate on the user side, since the opacity of online ad
platforms has not allowed further research inside. Our review
of privacy mechanisms establishes a correspondence between
the privacy risks identified in the first part of this work and the
proposals, both from academia and industry, that may address
them. Finally, we discuss some future research avenues.
We hope that, by systematizing the analysis of privacy
risks and protection mechanisms, this article provides privacy
designers and researchers with a far-reaching picture of the
current state of affairs in online advertising.
The remainder of this work is organized as follows. Sec. II
provides the necessary background in online advertising. Then,
Sec. III examines the privacy risks inherent to this scenario.
Sec. IV conducts a thorough analysis of the most relevant
mechanisms to mitigate such risks. In Sec. V, we discuss the
various threats identified and the mechanisms that may address
them. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Sec. VI.
II. BACKGROUND
This section examines the modern online advertising infras-
tructure, providing the reader with the necessary depth to un-
derstand the technical contributions of this work. Specifically,
we describe the main actors of the advertising ecosystem,
the interactions occurring among them, and the technologies
involved in the ad-delivery process.
A. The Online Advertising Landscape - From Past to Present
Advertising is commonly linked to commercial activities that
involve branding strategies intended to draw the attention of
potential customers. The objective of drawing attention is per-
suading users to buy a product or, generally, spawning brand
image. Historically, however, the way potential customers have
been contacted by advertisers to apply such strategies has
ended up bothering the ones they aimed at attracting [13].
The main problem of classical online advertising has been
commonly the very limited media infrastructure by which ads
have been distributed to customers. Without enough resources
to target users (e.g., TV viewers or newspaper readers),
advertisers used to massively flood the available media with
ads which very few people were interested in [14]. The flooded
message usually “touched” some customers but the strategy
was definitely inefficient. Currently, marketing announcements
are still sent to an audience that has a huge aggregate size
but which is also ultra-fragmented [15] [16]. This is due to
the broad range of available media channels (TV channels,
websites, etc.) and the volatility of the attention users put on
such channels [17].
Despite its shortcomings, online advertising has been a
profitable business and proved to be effective in terms of
ROI2, interaction and tracing of potential customers, and
reaching an audience [18]. The truth is also that, in the past,
audiences were not as fragmented, and the online ecosystem
was not as congested as it is currently. As a result, there were
more chances for such traditional advertising strategies to be
successful.
With the rise of the Internet, the advertising industry has
evolved significantly, especially in terms of its capability of
reaching potential customers on an individual basis. Modern
online advertising takes advantage of recommendation and
personalized information systems to tailor advertising cam-
paigns to the interests of Web users [19]. Thus, thanks to
2ROI or return on investment is an indicator used to measure the efficiency
of an investment.
3technologies like RTB, the core of the advertising business
is able to show ads to the right person and at the right time,
which implies greater effectiveness [20] [21] [9]. Additionally,
current online advertising provides more accountability and
transparency since the ad companies are encouraged to agree
on prices that directly match the effort undertaken by the
seller with the benefits received by the buyer. Consequently,
in economic terms, advertising services are traded based on
the force of demand and supply [5].
Although the online media has transformed the way ad-
vertising is conceived, it was not always so. The online
environment was originally overwhelmed by confusion where
the impact and fulfillment of advertising campaigns were
hardly determined objectively [3] [9]. For instance, advertisers
had to acquire inventory of spaces available to publish ads
without really knowing if such spaces were shown to people
interested in the promoted products. Moreover, the lack of
resources of the emerging advertising technologies of that
time prevented online actors from optimizing the ad-delivery
process.
At present, the online advertising landscape is triggered
by advertisers, who create the demand, and publishers, who
generate the supply. Websites have become the publishers
by excellence since the content they offer attracts people
whose interests can be revealed from intrinsic interactions
with the Web. Moreover, modern methods of online advertis-
ing management have incorporated intermediate entities that
help advertisers and publishers navigate the web topology
in order to connect them together [9]. Such intermediaries,
as explained below, are responsible for providing interactive
and automatic ad serving that is able to accurately target
the intended audience. The targeting strategy implemented
by these intermediary entities has directly influenced the ad-
personalization accuracy, but also the level of transparency of
the process whereby ads are delivered.
Lastly, it is worth stressing that the money produced by
online advertising is currently sustaining most of the “free”
content on the Web [22]. The money paid by advertisers
becomes revenues that are distributed among the different
actors of the ecosystem, including the publisher [3].
B. Online Advertising Players
The modern online advertising infrastructure has become
certainly complex and dynamic and, although more players
can be identified, three components deploy the main roles in
this industry. As illustrated in Fig. 2, these components are
advertisers, publishers and ad platforms, and their ultimate
goal is to display the right ad to the right user [5] [23]. The
former two components represent respectively the demand and
supply sides of the economic model that governs an online
advertising service [9]. The interactions between such players
are commonly enabled by an intermediate infrastructure called
an ad platform. Finally, users, whose data and requests are the
basis of the decisions made for online advertising services, are
not directly considered as part of this infrastructure since they
do not receive the revenues of such billion-dollar business.
Advertisers are entities that are interested in promoting
a brand or product by showing related ads to potential
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Fig. 2: Main components of the online advertising ecosystem.
customers. They are willing to pay for displaying their
ads [5] [23], and therefore they are the entities that generate
the demand of advertising services. Online advertisers are
basically aimed at displaying ads on some spaces of the
websites (publishers) users visit. Direct agreements may be
signed among advertisers and publishers to regulate the online
ad service, but these actors commonly get engaged through
intermediate platforms, as shown in Fig. 2. Obviously, the
use of intermediary entities makes this process more efficient.
Thanks to these entities, advertisers may target ads to the
intended audience of their marketing campaigns. Also, through
modern online advertising mechanisms like RTB, they may
participate directly in this targeting process. These capabilities
are crucial for advertisers to face the fragmentation of online
audiences.
A publisher is an entity, such as CNN or The New York
Times, which provides online content (e.g., newspapers, search
engines, blogs, etc.), usually through web pages. Since such
content draws the attention of users, advertisers pay publishers
to be assigned a space in a website, where they can show ads
to a given audience. Commonly, publishers supply advertisers
with an inventory of spaces (on their websites) to be filled with
marketing messages. Such inventory can be sold by contract
or in real time. As depicted in Fig. 3, a publisher is the
entity through which a user comes into contact with the online
advertising ecosystem.
Ad platforms are groups of entities that connect adver-
tisers with publishers through their demand and supply-side
interfaces. In particular, as can be seen in Fig. 3, ad platforms
constitute the marketplace where the demand and the supply
of online advertising services are matched [5]. In order to
effectively reach the currently fragmented online audiences
(i.e., a multitude of websites and a pretty scattered attention
of users), ad platforms arose to help advertisers and publishers
increase the selectivity and efficiency of ad space allocation.
Therefore, ad platforms may be considered as the centerpiece
of the modern Internet advertising business as they facilitate
the matching between the advertising material and users’
interests. The accuracy of said matching clearly depends on
the ad platforms’ ability to track and profile users based on the
information that can be mined from their online activity. The
ad-targeting process has in recent years become increasingly
sophisticated, which has inevitably led to the emergence of nu-
merous agents with very specialized roles. The upshot of this
more populated ecosystem (see Fig. 3) is a more automatic,
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Fig. 3: Disaggregated ad platform scheme and interactions between players.
transparent and flexible ad-delivery process. Throughout this
work, we shall refer to ad platforms as all the intermediary
entities that connect advertisers to publishers.
Originally, ad platforms used to aggregate only the inventory
provided by publishers. The aim was to help advertisers get
scale and impact (in terms of amount) when distributing
their ads; however, scale was not enough. Later, modern ad
platforms brought a more transparent infrastructure where
advertisers became capable of selecting the users to which
they wanted to show ads. To this end, ad platforms integrated
certain mechanisms to make the ad-targeting process more
accurate, transparent and flexible. Such mechanisms are now
implemented by different entities that are part of ad platforms.
These entities provide complementary services including ag-
gregation of demand and supply, and optimization of the ad-
serving process itself. Some of these entities are ad networks,
ad exchanges, and demand and supply-side platforms [9].
Ad networks and ad exchanges are the predecessors of ad
platforms. Ad networks began aggregating inventory for ad-
vertisers, and ad exchanges evolved to include more dynamic
mechanisms to serve ads through automated auctions [24].
Ad networks emerged to help advertisers select and buy
ad spaces across the congested and fragmented ad-serving
infrastructure. With this aim, such networks used to resell the
aggregated ad inventory acquired from publishers to advertis-
ers and related agencies [24]. For those publishers that directly
sold their inventory to big advertisers, ad networks became an
interesting entity through which to sell their remnant inventory
for a good price [3]. Other smaller ad networks were able
to give advertisers access to more selective audiences by
aggregating more specific inventory from small publishers.
Examples of ad networks include GoogleAdSense, Media.net
and PulsePoint.
Ad exchanges are ad platforms that currently sell their
aggregated inventory of ad spaces by means of auctions.
They keep consolidating ad spaces from publishers but of-
fer advertisers and publishers more effective and transparent
mechanisms to serve ads [5] [25]. First, ad exchanges place
ads based on automated auctions where advertisers “decide”
how much to pay for an ad space. The winning bidder is the
advertiser that ends up displaying the ad. Secondly, during
the auction, ad exchanges share with advertisers contextual
information about the user who generates the impression they
bid for. Such information helps advertisers decide whether to
bid for an ad space and how much to bid for it. The auction is
held just after a user requests content from a website partnering
with the ad exchange. The whole process may take a few
tenths of a second. Theoretically, this yields greater efficiency
since the ad-delivery process is distributed among the different
components of the ad platform [3]. Part of the aggregation
strategy of ad exchanges consists in combining multiple ad
networks together. This way, advertisers and publishers are
relieved from dealing with so many intermediaries.
Demand-side platforms (DSPs) are entities that work for
advertisers, i.e., for the actors generating the demand of ad
services. DSPs work on behalf of advertisers, in front of
the ad exchange, and help advertisers choose audiences and
adequate media to display their ads. By aggregating demand,
DSPs are capable of boosting selectiveness and effectiveness
for advertisers [3] [5].
Supply-side platforms (SSPs) are entities that work on
behalf of publishers, the actors that supply ad spaces to
advertisers. SSPs offer publishers an optimized strategy to
manage their advertising inventory. Since the task of targeting
an ad to a given user involves advanced capabilities and
resources, publishers delegate this task to SSPs, with the hope
of getting increased demand and profits, despite the congested
online ecosystem.
Data aggregators are entities that collect information about
Internet users with the aim of profiling their purchasing inter-
ests. Data aggregators’ services aim at tailoring ad marketing
strategies to the users’ preferences they have learned by means
of massive data mining. From data aggregators, another entity
called data exchange arises. Data exchanges provide demand
and supply-side platforms as well as ad exchanges with user
data to help them make their targeting decisions.
1) General Operation of Online Advertising: Having shown
the main components of the online advertising ecosystem, now
we proceed to briefly describe how ads are delivered on the
Web.
Currently, ad serving aims at providing automated processes
and transparent interactions to advertising entities. However,
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Fig. 4: Current online advertising architecture composed by publishers, ad
platforms and advertisers. The ad-delivering process requires that publishers
include a link to the ad platform they want to partner with (1); for the sake
of simplicity, we consider here a single ad platform. When a user visits pages
partnering with this ad platform, the browser is instructed to load the URLs
provided by the ad platform. Through the use of third-party cookies and other
tracking mechanisms, the ad platform is able to track all these visits and build
a browsing profile (2). Based on this profile, the user’s location and other
parameters, the ad platform uses its targeting algorithm to decide which ad
to present on the publisher’s page.
there are many interactions involved that make the ad-serving
process really complex and completely opaque to the user. In
general, when a user visits a website, personalized advertise-
ments are displayed together with the content of the site, as if
they were part of the same structure. According to the user’s
perception, ads seem to be served by the same web server.
Although the user participation in the ad-serving process is
merely passive, the entire process is triggered by a user’s
request to download Web content.
This way, when a user’s browser sends an HTTP request
to a website that is associated with an ad exchange, the
website sends back the content the user is requesting. Such
content is interpreted by the browser and then displayed to
the user. Along with the content, additional code, in the form
of ad tags, is sent to the browser and executed automatically.
The execution of this code triggers a connection from the
browser to the ad exchange in question, which asks for
advertisements to fill the ad spaces on the visited page. When
the ad exchange receives the ad call, the process of selecting
the right ad for the best price is performed by some of the
intermediary entities described above. Mechanisms such as
RTB and cookie matching (CM) are used to ensure the greatest
impact on users (which benefits advertisers) together with the
highest profits for the ad-serving platform (which includes
publishers). Fig. 4 shows the current architecture of online
advertising composed mainly by publishers, ad platforms and
advertisers, and illustrates the process whereby third-party ads
are displayed to users.
C. Supporting Technologies for Ad Serving
The ad-serving process has significantly evolved from the days
when advertisers selected the media to deploy ads long before
a user visited a website. Currently, advertisers may decide, in
real time, which ad to display. As described in the background
section, ad platforms take in the order of milliseconds to target
an ad to a user based on their preferences and the campaign
requirem nts specified by the advertiser in question. Two main
processes are involved. On the one hand, a behavioral profiling
task is conducted against a visiting user; this is done on the
basis of any inf rmation collected about them [20]. On the
other hand, automated auctions are used to distribute ads in
favor of advertisers, in accordance with their willingness to
bid for a particular profiled user.
Mechanisms such as CM and RTB have been developed
to support the modern online advertising platforms, by fa-
cilitating ad serving personalization and enabling a more
efficient and profitable ad distribution system. In the coming
subsections, we overview these two mechanisms.
1) Cookie Matching: In order to decide whether and how
much to bid for users’ impressions, online advertisers require
as much information as possible about such users. To come
to that decision, the first task of ad platforms is to individuate
users so that different attributes can be associated with a
(almost) single virtual identity. CM is a mechanism that assists
an online advertising platform, and in general a web tracker,
in “recognizing” users across the Web. As we shall explain
later on, said assistance is key to the bidding processes [26].
CM is based on cookies, which are randomly generated
strings of text that web servers send to users’ browsers.
Cookies are employed to recognize users in subsequent visits.
By “identifying” their users, servers are capable of offering
personalized services. The same strategy is applied by an ad
exchange when serving ads to users, in order to recognize
them on a later auction. When a new auction is to be held, an
ad exchange sends (ad call) the identifier it keeps about the
user to the prospective bidders (advertisers). Such an identifier
(cookie) allows advertisers (or their corresponding DSPs) to
find any other cookie left on the user’s browser in previous
auctions. Moreover, an advertiser by itself might have placed
cookies on the user’s browser from a process unrelated to
auctions [3]. Cookies coupled with auction processes may
enable advertisers (and other entities) to build profiles of
users with information about their browsing history and buying
habits.
The process of CM, also called cookie syncing, allows
an advertiser and an ad exchange to match the identifiers
(cookies) they have about a single user, so that they can share
information about them. As stated above, such information
enables advertisers to make a more informed decision on
whether and how much to bid for an ad impression. A de-
tailed description of how CM works in Google’s ad exchange
DoubleClick can be found in [26].
2) Real-Time Bidding: Bidding, in general, has represented
a breakthrough for the online advertising business. Bidding
initially arose for paid-search advertising [27], with the aim
of giving transparency to the process of ranking advertisers
on search engine results pages. After spamming had affected
the quality of search results provided by search engine mar-
keting, and after having realized that such a system prevented
smaller companies from participating in the emerging online
advertising system, auctions appeared as a mechanism to
“democratize” the access to the ad-serving ecosystem [3].
6RTB, also called programmatic buying, is an auction-based
technology for online advertising. RTB mimics a stock ex-
change to enable automatic buying and selling of ads [1].
This automatization allows RTB to perform a per-impression
bidding just in the moment such an impression is generated.
Classic bidding used to take place way before the user
accessed the web page where an ad was displayed. Modern
bidding, however, is perceived as a real-time process since ad
serving is conducted in a fraction of second [28].
RTB enables advertisers to bid for the chance to display an
ad on a web page loaded by a user’s browser. After such a
process, a publisher shows the ad of the advertiser that won
the bid. When a user spawns a request from their browser
to a website engaged with an ad exchange, a corresponding
ad call is generated to the ad exchange. Upon receiving the
ad call (asking for advertising), the ad exchange sends a bid
request to the advertisers that might be interested in sending
ads to a user. Along with the bid request, ad exchanges send
valuable information about the user whose impression is being
auctioned [29]. Cookies are extensively used by ad exchanges
and advertisers to collect and share such information, and
thus improve the accuracy of the ad-targeting process [30].
In fact, the very detailed contextual information provided
through cookie-related technology helps advertisers and DSPs
to make the decision of whether and how much to bid for an
impression. After bids are made, a winner is determined during
a real-time auction. In a last step, the ad exchange notifies the
winner advertiser and its ad is served on the website through
the user’s browser. This last step may entail a content-delivery
network.
III. PRIVACY THREATS IN ONLINE ADVERTISING
The pervasive dissemination of online advertising on the
Internet and the prevailing need of ad platforms and other
intermediary entities to collect a wealth of data about Web
users prompt serious concerns regarding user privacy [31] [32].
In fact, much of the concern regarding privacy and thus
regarding privacy threats in online advertising are derived
from the risks of misuse of this huge amount of user data,
which is held by advertising platforms. Said misuse of user
information might include common privacy issues such as
data leakage, unauthorized collection of data, and sharing
with a third-party. Interestingly, as surveyed in Sec. II, the
structure of ad platforms and the abilities of their players
reflect behaviors strictly coincidental with such privacy issues.
In accordance with the above reflection, in this section, we
identify the privacy threats specifically inherent to, or arising
as a result of, online advertising, based on a characterization
of the main players as potential attackers, and of the effects
of their capabilities as primary threats.
This analysis and that of Sec. IV exclude the specific
context involving mobile devices, albeit much of the following
reasoning might still be true for both desktop-based and mobile
browsing. Certainly, advertising in mobile communication
environments, deserve a separate study, given the complexity
of their infrastructures and the growing use of smartphones
connected to Internet.
Finally, we want to note that, although the concept of
privacy is intimately related to that of information security,
the former is addressed here as a particular field of the latter,
whose focus is on protecting user data from being revealed,
without consent, to potential attackers. Thus, the scenarios in
which the user information leaks could be classified as risky.
A. Attacker Model
Privacy criteria are commonly defined in terms of the amount
and quality of information that potential attackers might be
able to collect about users. Further, characterizing such po-
tential attackers is of special relevance since user privacy is
generally measured with respect to the adversary’s capabilities
as in [33].
Should we consider any entity with access to user data as
a privacy attacker, the modern online ecosystem is nowadays
plagued by potential adversaries. In the context we address,
such adversaries are the multiple intermediate entities devel-
oped as part of the online advertising architecture. Although
most of these prospective attackers are not directly involved in
the raw web traffic spawned by a user, a variety of contextual
user information is leaked to ad-serving entities [34] [35].
In general, the information typically collected about a user
includes their clickstream, browsing history, shopping habits,
preference ratings, entertainment preferences, location, gender,
age, and agent string [36].
The online applications and devices (such as browsers and
computers) that are daily employed by users lend themselves
to the generation of a sort of digital signature that can be
subject to fingerprinting. This signature is built with a chain of
pieces of information (software installed, plug-ins, and version
of applications) that almost uniquely identify a user on the
Web. No matter if a user deletes their cookies, they can be
tracked online through such a string of data, commonly called
an agent string [36].
Even though these items of information might not seem
relevant to the identity of a user, several studies have shown
that data on some of these “tags” might be sufficient to
unambiguously identify a user within a country [37] [38].
Potential attackers in the online advertising ecosystem could
be classified as first and third parties, according to the in-
teraction level of each entity with the user. A first party is
directly (consciously) contacted by a user. Nevertheless, third
parties are contacted through requests which are not explicitly
triggered by users. In this context, publishers may be regarded
as the only first-party entities, since the interaction with them
is directly made by users; the rest of the components of the
advertising architecture depicted in Fig. 3 may be considered
as “third-party adversaries”. Naturally, the scope of all these
potential privacy attackers will vary from local to global
according to the amount of users whose information is traded
through every component. Of course, such hierarchical scope
will determine the aggregation ability and, therefore, the level
of privacy risk posed by each of these components.
Publishers can be considered first-party potential attackers
within the online advertising ecosystem. Attracting users to
its web pages, a publisher receives direct requests from them.
7Component Attacker’s role User collected data Scope
Aggregation
ability level
Privacy
risk level
Publisher First-party
clickstream, local browsing history,
preferences, demographics, agent string,
identification
Local Low Low
Advertiser Third-party restricted browsing history, preferences,demographics, identification Local/Global Low Medium
SSP Third-party
clickstream, restricted browsing history,
preferences, demographics, agent string,
identification
Global Medium High
DSP Third-party restricted browsing history, preferences,demographics, identification Global Medium Medium
Ad exchange Third-party
clickstream, detailed browsing history,
preferences, demographics, agent string,
identification
Global High High
Broadband
provider First-party
every single trace of user interactions with
the Web Global High High
TABLE I: Components of our adversary model in the scenario of online advertising.
From such requests, some items of user information can
be immediately inferred such as location and agent string.
Depending on the type of publisher (news, shopping, social
network, rating, etc.), certain information about the user such
as gender, age, shopping habits or preference ratings may also
be collected. The tracking mechanisms used by publishers are
supported on their web log files and first-party cookies.
Advertisers become third-party adversaries since they re-
ceive information about users from subtle requests that de-
rive from a user’s page visits. Browsing history, location,
gender, shopping habits, and other basic contextual data is
typically leaked by the online advertising infrastructure so
that advertisers can decide whether to bid or not for a given
user impression. However, since the described interaction is
currently subcontracted to aggregating entities like DSPs and
ad networks, the ability of advertisers to directly access user
information is significantly diminished.
The ability of DSPs to aggregate user information make
these intermediaries very powerful potential adversaries to user
privacy. Working for thousands of advertisers, a DSP is respon-
sible for selecting the best impressions to bid on. This bidding
process is carried out on the basis of both users’ metadata and
advertisers’ specific campaign requirements. Users’ contextual
data are included in billions of bid requests sent by dozens
of associated ad exchanges. Hence, it is difficult to imagine
the amount of user information that DSPs are fed with, even
without winning auctions. In fact, although ad exchanges
recommend not to misuse the contextual information contained
in such bid requests, a massive surveillance engine could be
deployed through a group of colluding DSPs.
SSPs are the primary source of user information in the
current automatic advertising architecture. Helping thousands
of publishers interact with other intermediaries such as ad
exchanges, SSPs make an offer of an ad space to at least
one ad exchange when a user triggers an impression. To
give context to such an offer, it is sent along with user
data that SSPs gather from different sources. These data may
include the visited website, cookies, and browsing information.
Thus, SSPs consolidate huge amounts of user data, which
raises serious privacy concerns, especially when much of this
information comes directly from publishers. From a user’s
perspective, DSPs and SSPs are third-party adversaries, as they
are fed with private, sensitive information that does not come
directly from users.
Acting as gateways between buyers (DSPs) and sellers
(SSPs), ad exchanges are one of the strongest third-party
adversaries in our privacy attacker model. These higher-level
entities consolidate ad spaces offered by multiple publishers
(SSPs) and organize automatic auctions to sell such spaces
to advertisers (DSPs). With that objective, ad exchanges con-
centrate most of the online advertising traffic and the user
information used as input to effectively distribute ads. But not
only that, ad exchanges also massively distribute such user
data to multiple advertisers (mainly DSPs) so that the latter can
make their bidding decisions. Given such capabilities of con-
solidating and indiscriminately distributing user information,
ad exchanges are clearly the most powerful privacy attackers
of the online advertising ecosystem.
Finally, although they are not strictly part of the online
advertising architecture, broadband providers are unsurpris-
ingly part of the attacker model we have described. Offering
the transport channel that connects every user with the Web,
these network-layer intermediaries have privileged access to
user information, including that of ad related interactions.
Table I summarizes the major conclusions of this subsection.
B. Classification of Privacy Threats and User Role
Having specified the adversary model assumed in this work,
which we described on the basis of the different intermediary
entities involved in the ad-delivery process, next we proceed
to classify the corresponding privacy threats based on the
capabilities of such entities and the limitations of users.
1) Platform Intrinsic Leaks: The main cause of privacy
threats in online advertising is tightly coupled with the in-
frastructure and capabilities of ad platforms. To start, within
this infrastructure, every tracking mechanism is enabled by
default; there is not a built-in option for users to disable
tracking or ad serving. Additionally, as depicted in Sec. II,
this infrastructure is significantly crowded with intermediate
entities directly or indirectly fed with user data. Also, it is
8Code Privacy threat Brief description
T1 First-party tracking user information leaks out directly from the user side to the publisher
T2 Third-party tracking user information leaks out from interactions between intermediate advertising entities and the user
T3 Cookie matching user cookies are mapped and shared between ad exchanges and advertisers
T4 Fingerprinting an identifying agent string is derived by first and third parties from certain specific characteristics of user applications anddevices
T5 Flash cookies intrusive and persistent cookie technology enabled by Flash-based websites
T6 Canvas fingerprinting enables user tracking based on a fingerprint generated by the rendering of Canvas HTML5 elements
T7 HTML5 local storage long persistent cookie-based tracking technology developed as part of the HTML5 language
TABLE II: Summary of the privacy threats examined in our analysis.
Code User role limitations Brief description
L1 Lack of awareness the leakage of personal information is not evident for users in online advertising
L2 Lack of control user preferences and concerns are not technically enforced by default in online advertising
L3 Bounded technical knowledge users barely have the technical knowledge to understand and effectively use protection tools
TABLE III: Summary of the user role limitations examined in our analysis.
evident that the business model of online advertising, and so its
infrastructure, builds on the collection of as much information
about users as possible.
Regarding their capabilities, online advertising platforms
carry out practices that support advanced levels of user tar-
geting while neglecting privacy and even supporting the leak
of personal data. In this subsection, we briefly examine such
practices, which are mainly based on user tracking [35] [39].
Based on the interaction between users and privacy attackers,
tracking mechanisms can be classified into first and third-party
mechanisms. As we shall see next, these mechanisms mostly
employ cookies to individuate users. Table III summarizes
these threats.
T1. First-Party Tracking encompasses the activities per-
formed by first-party adversaries (mainly publishers) to collect
and analyze user information. Such activities include serving
(first-party) cookies directly by the publisher to its users
and mining the firsthand information provided by them in
their web requests (location and agent string). Depending on
the publisher’s interaction level with its users, very valuable
personal information could be directly gathered by publishers
(gender, ratings, social interactions, preferences, shopping
habits, health condition). Since the interactions leaking this
information are explicitly triggered by the user, they are
unlikely to be cataloged as malicious. Thus, detecting or
blocking first-party tracking is just as complex, yet the scope
of first-party tracking (and thus its privacy risks) is limited to
the size of the publisher’s audience. Though, some publishers
might collude with aggregating entities such as ad exchanges
to provide them with aggregated user information [40].
T2. Third-Party Tracking builds on indirect (and non-
consented) interactions between intermediate advertising enti-
ties (DSPs, SSPs, ad exchanges) and users. Such interactions
are generated by content embedded in first-party sites from
which user information is also leaked to third parties. The
wider scope and higher hierarchy of entities performing third-
party tracking for digital advertising facilitate massive aggre-
gation of personal information. However, third party tracking
is not only deployed through cookies, but also by means of so-
cial plug-ins that may also disclose user browsing information
to social networks [41]. Mechanisms aimed at protecting users
from privacy risks of online advertising commonly block third-
party connections after classifying them as undesired [42].
T3. Cookie Matching is a technology that supports the
sharing of user data. Served both by first and third-party
adversaries, cookies are the basic tracking technology used
in online advertising. Within online advertising, cookies have
given rise to concerns about the privacy of users for two
main reasons. First, cookies are currently being used to store
personal information (such as e-mail addresses), not only
identifiers to recognize a user in future visits [43]. Secondly,
they enable massive sharing of such personal data through
a more refined tracking technology, CM. CM enables an ad
exchange to share users’ cookie information with multiple
potential advertisers so that they can infer contextual user
data by mapping their own cookies (obtained from previous
interactions with a user) with the ones obtained from the ad
exchange [30].
Experiments done by Bashir et al. in [40] report about the
ubiquity of CM on today’s Web and on how shared information
supports highly targeted advertising. It is worth noting that,
although using cookies is an old practice originally built
upon pretty small pieces of identifying information, they have
significantly evolved to become large capacity structures, very
popular tracking mechanisms, and increasingly more difficult
to delete, as illustrated in Tables IV and V. Accordingly, a
great deal of recent research has been done regarding online
tracking [44] [45] [46], studied in desktop browsing contexts
where the most evolved forms of cookies [47] [48] are subject
to analysis.
T4. Fingerprinting, not built on cookies, is also available to
support personalized online advertising. It consists in detecting
the agent string of users’ devices or applications. Thus, no
matter if a user deletes her cookies, they can always be tracked
online through such an agent string [36]. As a matter of
fact, some variations of fingerprinting are commonly used
to respawn cookies after a user deleted them. Mayer and
Mitchel synthesize in [25] a list of non-cookie web tracking
technologies used both from first and third-party entities.
T5. Flash Cookies [47] pose an alternative tracking tech-
nology for advertising entities trying to face the advent
of mechanisms to block traditional tracking. Flash cookies
are more effective in tracking users than common HTTP
cookies. In fact, Flash cookies are considered prominently
intrusive due to their persistence characteristics (more storage
capacity, browser independent storage, and non-default expi-
9Max. storage
size
Level of
persistence
Storage
location
Difficulty
to delete Usage level Installation Access level
HTTP
cookies 4 KB low
within the
browser low remaining native one browser
Flash
cookies 100 KB medium
outside the
browser high declining
through a
plug-in
multiple
browsers
HTML 5
cookies 5 MB high
within the
browser high increasing native one browser
TABLE IV: Comparison of the types of cookies that are typically used to track users.
ration) [47] [48] [49]. After online advertisers were accused
of misusing Flash cookies (by enabling restoring of deleted
HTTP cookies), a study by McDonald and Cranor [50] found
that the practice of respawning erased cookies had become
significantly less aggressive.
T6. Canvas Fingerprinting is another persistent web track-
ing technology currently used by some online advertising
agents, especially data aggregators [51]. Canvas fingerprinting
facilitates tracking by generating a fingerprint of a user’s
browser from an HTML 5 Canvas element [44]. Such an
element might be used by an (first or third-party) adversary
to dynamically display, even invisible, text or images in the
user’s browser. Since the rendering of the Canvas element
will slightly vary depending on the web browser’s image
processing resources, such particular displaying parameters
could be used to get a fingerprint that might uniquely identify a
user surfing a web page; to do it, certain browser properties are
collected such as the list of installed plug-ins [36]. A few first
and third-party providers of Canvas fingerprinting have been
found from previous studies [44] and the tracking mechanism
can be blocked if the provider’s domain is known.
T7. HTML5 Local Storage is an even more persistent
cookie-based tracking technology, developed as part of the
HTML5 web language. Local storage enables more universal
user tracking [52] that does not depend on the browser
used, does not expire, and offers even more storage capacity,
by default, than HTTP and Flash cookies (see Table IV).
Such a feature might let some first or third parties store
data (within the user’s browser) that cannot be deleted when
erasing browser’s cookies. However, such intrusive tracking
mechanisms might be aggressively tackled with lawsuits, es-
pecially when accomplished by advertisers, as Wired reported
in 2010 [53]. Said misusing of cookies was reported by
Hoofnagle et al. in 2012 [52] when they found that some
companies had been using HTML5 and Flash cookies to
respawn HTTP cookies that had been previously deleted by
users. In Table V we summarize some of the characteristics
of these tracking mechanisms including their effectiveness in
individuating users, and whether the companies using them
have faced lawsuits due to the intrusiveness of these mecha-
nisms.
Other intrinsic properties of ad platforms make them pretty
susceptible to privacy leaks. For example, the subtlety of their
background processes isolates users in a separate dimension
where they are unaware of the implicit risks. In addition, as
recently reported in [43], relevant user information might be
being conveyed in the clear text during real-time auctions. In
the same, [29] and [40] reported cooperation between relevant
entities such as ad exchanges and publishers, and quantified the
derived leakage of users’ browsing information. On a last note,
chances are that the context information that feeds auctions
will reach entities not really involved in bidding processes
(or deliberately bidding to lose). Should ad platforms cannot
detect such behavior, a cheap massive surveillance tool could
be built on top of advertising infrastructures.
2) User Role Limitations: User capabilities are, by default,
pretty limited online. Although their interactions fuel ad
delivery services, users are unaware of the transactions that
are made in the background when they are served an ad,
which also reduces their chances to protect themselves. This
blindness and lack of control of users is the source of important
privacy threats, especially in online advertising systems, where
ad services are inherent to web browsing.
L1. Lack of awareness. Historically, online privacy has
been a concern for users, as reflected in [54]. However, as
explained by Ackerman et al., when faced with an abstract
context where the leakage of personal information is not
evident (as it might be within social networks), users’ concerns
get significantly lightened. This attitude of users towards
privacy, particularly in advertising environments, is illustrated
in [55], which report that users are more concerned about
being shown embarrassing ads than about being tracked.
In accordance with said lack of awareness, users hardly no-
tice the relative value of their data within commercial contexts.
Evidence on the dichotomy on how users and ad services value
user data is offered in [56] and [29], respectively.
L2. Lack of control. In the opaque scenario of online ad-
vertising, users cannot protect their privacy adequately. Neither
their interests nor concerns can be enforced because users are,
by default, passive entities in the advertising ecosystem.
L3. Bounded technical knowledge. Users face an impor-
tant cognitive barrier that seriously limits their capabilities
to manage their protection against privacy threats in online
advertising. Even being aware of the risks posed in this
context, and having the control to at least mitigate some of
them, most users do not have the technical knowledge to
understand the logic of protecting themselves within such a
complex scenario.
Consequently, in online advertising contexts — unlike what
happens in other online scenarios —, leaks of user data are
not driven by user explicit flaws but arise from the complex
structure and operation of the ad-serving process. Ironically,
online advertising was said to offer users more control over
advertising exposure than traditional advertising [57].
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Effectiveness
individuating users
Ad companies
involved
Have led to
lawsuits?
Easily erasable
from browser? Usage level
Are
intrusive?
HTTP cookies High All [44] No Yes Extended No
Flash cookies High
hulu.com, about.com,
aol.com, Clearspring,
Interclick, Quantcast [25] [44]
Yes No Extended Yes
Canvas
fingerprinting Low Addthis [44] Yes No Limited Yes
HTML5 local
storage High
Ringleader Digital,
Bluecava [25] [48] Yes No Growing Yes
TABLE V: Tracking mechanisms used in modern online advertising.
C. Impact of Online Advertising Practices on Privacy
Since ad personalization (e.g., based on location, context
and interests) increases conversion rates, users’ browsing data
have inevitably become an asset that nowadays is exchanged
throughout the entire online advertising infrastructure [43].
The need to further scrutinize this information to profile and
segment users raises serious privacy concerns with respect to
social sorting and discrimination, particularly as potentially
sensitive information can be inferred from the profile of
a reidentified user, such as income level, health issues or
political preferences.
Modern auction-based ad delivery requires that processes
be executed in real-time, which implies that vast amounts of
user information be mined at very high rates. This urgent need
might naturally discourage the online actors from protecting
user information against privacy attacks. Besides the urgency
in which data must be handled, the need to offer tailored ads
compels the advertising ecosystem to collect a wide range
of metadata. For this reason, practices such as cooperation
(collusion) among advertising entities and aggregation are
enabled to facilitate massive and often uncontrolled sharing
of said information [30]. Since the shared data (sometimes
including even the prices paid by advertisers) are not always
encrypted, other adversaries, such as Internet providers, come
into the picture.
As described in previous sections, online advertising builds
on non-transparent interactions among a myriad of intermedi-
ary ad companies, which have the ability to profile Web users.
As a result, not even publishers are aware of which information
is collected and how it is used. In fact, publishers are unaware
of what ads are shown to their visiting users. The ad-delivery
process involves so many intermediary companies that it is
impossible for an ad exchange to control the use of user data
by such companies. In fact, cases are known where attackers
took advantage of advertising channels to distribute malicious
code to millions of users [8]. This lack of transparency
obviously prevents users from actively getting involved in the
protection of their privacy. Though there are informed users
who use transparency and protection tools while browsing,
advanced mechanisms are currently implemented by the online
advertising ecosystem to counteract cookie removal or ad
blocking.
Finally, due to the auction-based policies of the advertising
ecosystem, certain users invariably become more economically
valuable than others. For example, Olejnik et al. found in [29]
that, in terms of prices paid during online auctions, visitors
of websites belonging to particular categories are much more
relevant than visitors of websites of other categories. Yet,
other criteria such as the user location and time of visit might
also be used to determine the relevance of the corresponding
profiles. Such more relevant users stand out from the rest and
gradually their profiles become more identifiable and, as a
result, less private. Unfortunately, evidence has been found
suggesting that negative discrimination (such as racism) might
be performed in online ad delivery [58].
IV. ANALYSIS OF PRIVACY-PROTECTING APPROACHES
The privacy risks posed by the tracking and profiling practices
of the online advertising industry have motivated a variety of
privacy-protecting approaches from academia. These research
initiatives mostly rely on mechanisms that may support or
complement the current economic model of the Web, while
others suggest moderate blocking of third-party tracking3 to
protect user privacy. Other plug-and-play proposals are also
available to users and are supported commercially. In essence,
such approaches provide users with transparency and control
functionalities over their browsing data, yet putting at risk the
Web economic model, currently built on the revenues of online
advertising, through radical blocking mechanisms.
In this section, we address the main parameters that char-
acterize the current privacy protection approaches in online
advertising, in particular, their location, scope of application
and strategy. Afterwards, we analyze the most relevant re-
search work and industry proposals which tackle the problem
of privacy protection in online advertising.
A. Protection Parameters
Our analysis of privacy mechanisms examines three main
aspects, which we proceed to describe.
1) Location: According to the location where the protection
mechanism takes place, the current research proposals and
commercial solutions can be classified roughly into local and
third-party. On the one hand, local mechanisms commonly lie
on the user side, for example, in the form of an application
running on the user’s browser, or as a local service operating
in the user’s network [61]. Some academic approaches propose
migrating the profiling processes required for ad targeting to
the user side [35]. On the other hand, third-party mechanisms
are implemented with the help of a broker entity, whose
location is remote from the user side, and whose aim is
3The vast majority of ads today are served by third-party entities [59], [60].
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IV. Mechanisms for Privacy Enhancement in Online Advertising
IV-B. Academic Research IV-C. Commercial Solutions
ObliviAd
AdJail
Privad
Adnostic
RePriv
Privacy Badger
MyTrackingChoices
MyAdChoices
AdReveal
XRay
Adblock Plus and
similar ad blockers
Ghostery
Google Sharing
Google Contributor
Brave
Subscribe2Web
Network-level
ad blocking
Fig. 5: List of privacy mechanisms, specifically intended for online advertising, that we examine in Sec. IV.
commonly to provide security services such as secure storage
of data, anonymization and even user profiling [62]. We
would like to stress that, even in the case of broker-based
mechanisms, a local application on the user side is frequently
required to engage users to said broker.
2) Scope: Depending on the scope of application of the
mechanism in question, we may characterize it as local or
global. Protection approaches whose scope is local usually
aim at adapting a protection mechanism to the structure of the
current advertising ecosystem. Hence, the scope of protection
offered is also limited to the information and interactions
available to the user. On the other hand, those protection
approaches with a global scope come in hand with new ad
delivery models, pretending to radically change the manner in
which ad serving processes currently function, especially with
regard to their relationship with users. The majority of these
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approaches has been envisioned as privacy-by-design models
of advertising which would provide users with significant
control over their interactions with ad platforms.
3) Strategy: In our classification of privacy technologies,
we also consider the principle or strategy that rely on. We
contemplate five strategies which range from user lack of
awareness through transparency, to undesired interactions with
third-parties by means of blocking, obfuscation, and sandbox-
ing, and to a by-default exclusion of users from the advertising
logic through more inclusive techniques. Next, we describe
these strategies.
Transparency: Undoubtedly, a first step towards privacy
protection may be transparency. Transparency in this context
means allowing users to learn what is going on with regard to
their activity and data in online advertising systems. Some of
the approaches examined in the coming subsections provide
transparency usually by making users aware of the tracking
activities behind the scenes, and by allowing them to know
how their browsing traces might have been exploited to deliver
targeted ads.
Blocking: Blocking is also a very common, although usu-
ally radical, strategy of privacy protection in online advertis-
ing [42]. Typically, blocking tools inhibit most of the known
tracking mechanisms (and thus of advertising) from the user
side, or a third-party located on their network. Because the
vast majority of ads are delivered nowadays through third-
party trackers, cutting of third-party tracking implies elimi-
nating nearly all ads. Originally, blocking mechanisms had
been designed as a binary choice, namely, either blocking
or allowing all tracking and hence advertising. Nevertheless,
recent academic proposals tend to lighten this radical strategy
by providing fine-grained control over tracking, by enforcing
users’ preferences and by using smart and dynamic learning
mechanisms [63] [64].
Obfuscation: It consists in perturbing sensitive data in order
to preclude an adversary from discovering the identity of its
owner and/or deriving private information about them [65].
In the context of online advertising, some privacy protection
approaches implement obfuscation by mixing data and meta-
data of a group of user profiles so that the intrinsic features
of individual profiles cannot be recognized. Other approaches
build on external brokers to anonymize user data by randomly
masking potentially identifying attributes such as IP addresses
and cookies.
Sandboxing: Sandboxing addresses security threats by iso-
lating suspicious applications from the resources they rely on.
Within online advertising, sandboxing is applied by keeping
apart certain critical processes which may give advertising bro-
kers access to sensitive user data. A typical sandboxing exam-
ple leverages on the execution user profiling on the premises
of the user, rather than on the ad-platform side [35] [66] [67].
User Inclusion: With the aim of balancing the Internet’s
dominant business model and user privacy, some proposals
envision a more user-driven ecosystem. In general, giving
users more control over their interactions with ad platforms
might help achieve said balance. A practical step towards this
consists in adapting the protection mechanisms to the needs
of users. In this line, most ad blocking solutions have recently
started to offer users some personalization features such as
blocking per domain and per tracker. Other strategies include
the enforcement of user choices over third-party, cookie-
based tracking, and the provision of direct interfaces with the
advertising ecosystem [66], [68].
B. Academic Initiatives
This section examines in depth the most relevant approaches
in the academic literature of privacy-enhancing technologies
for online advertising. Fig. 5 provides an overview of the
technologies explored in this section.
1) ObliviAd: Proposed by Backes et al. [62], ObliviAd
relies on adapting secure-coprocessor-based brokers to the
current online advertising ecosystem. The aim of such co-
processors is providing private information retrieval of user
data during the delivery of ads to users and the billing to
advertisers. To do so, this approach provides different services
such as the secure storage of sensitive user data; the encryption
of profile information when it is conveyed to the broker side;
the encryption of ad information to be displayed on the user
side; and finally the obfuscation of billing data to charge
advertisers.
While all these services that integrate ObliviAd may of-
fer strong security guarantees through hardware and heavy
cryptographic techniques, this is undoubtedly at the cost of
a significant increase in complexity and deployment. It is
worth stressing as well that network and browser identifiers
such as the user’s IP address and user agents might still leak,
which means that this approach might not be useful against the
fingerprinting techniques described in the background section
of this work.
2) AdJail: Ter Louw et al. [69] proposes a tool that aims
at empowering publishers to isolate the content elements to
which ads will have access to. Specifically, this approach
allows safeguarding a user’s scope and that of the web ap-
plication by creating a sandbox where ads are executed. From
this sandbox, ads may have access to user or publisher content
through a configurable set of enforcing policies. Although the
aim of AdJail is to protect the confidentiality and integrity
of user and publisher data, user privacy can also be provided
by applying those policies based on the privacy agreement
negotiated between publishers and their users.
The problem of AdJail, however, is that its scope is limited
to the publisher’s domain. In other words, users can utilize this
sandboxing approach only if this mechanism is deployed in the
website. In addition, AdJail focuses more on other security
services such as integrity and confidentiality, and does not
tackle the privacy threats identified in Sec. III.
3) Privad: S. Guha et al. [67] seeks a more private online
advertising system and offers to this end an alternative private
solution that may adapt seamlessly to the current advertising
business model. The authors argue that Privad, their solution,
would preserve privacy by keeping a user’s browsing profile
within a local user application. Nonetheless, they also claim
that some information (related to the user’s interests and to
the ads the they have viewed or clicked) “necessarily” would
leave the user’s domain.
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Protection mechanism Location Scope Protection strategy
Transparency Blocking Obfuscation Sandboxing User inclusion
ObliviAd
local,
third-party local 3 3
AdJail
local,
third-party (1) 3 3
Privad
local,
third-party local 3 3
Adnostic local
local,
global (2) 3 3 3
RePriv local local 3 3 3
Privacy Badger local local 3 3 3
MyTrackingChoices local local 3 3 3
MyAdChoices local local 3 3 3
AdReveal local local 3
XRay local local 3
TABLE VI: The academic proposals for privacy enhancement in online advertising are classified on the basis of the protection parameters described in
Sec. IV-C. (1) AdJail’s scope focuses on the publisher; accordingly, we categorize this proposal neither as local nor as global; (2) although Adnostic’s
protection mechanism lies in the user side, ad platforms would need to adapt to support it.
Privad also incorporates a third-party anonymizing proxy.
This proxy would receive the released (and ciphered) user in-
formation and, after hiding the user network address, it would
deliver this information to an ad platform. Advertisers aiming
at delivering ads feed the ad platform with their ads, including
information of the profile to which each ad is targeted; and
then this information is employed by the ad platform to tailor
ads to those profiles. Consequently, this approach uses the
proxy to anonymize user information so that the ad platform in
question is not able to individuate a user from the preferences
reports generated by their browsing activity. Unfortunately,
anonymizing strategies like this have proved to be weak [38],
especially when demographic information about users is still
available for a potential attacker, and when such information
is managed by a third-party entity over which a user might
not have any control (such as an Internet service provider).
4) Adnostic: It is an academic proposal by Toubiana et
al. [70] that implements a more friendly architecture to display
personalized advertising without compromising user privacy.
Such architecture does not rely on blocking ads but on
performing the whole user profiling process within the user
domain, so that no personal information is leaked out to third
parties.
The ads to be shown to a user are chosen on their side,
according to a locally estimated browsing profile. This profile
is constructed by processing the user’s queries and the content
of visited pages. Then, this information is classified within the
browser by means of natural language processing techniques.
The ads, which are part of a previously downloaded set, are
displayed according to the user’s interests.
Because personalization is not directly controlled by ad
platforms, there are less incentives for advertisers to bid
more money to place ads. However, we may expect worse
personalization performance since this process takes place on
the user side, based only on their browsing data. This is in
contrast to the current ad-targeting algorithms implemented
by ad platforms which rely on massive amounts of aggregated
user data.
In terms of impact on the current infrastructure, on the
other hand, Adnostic would eliminate the requirement of
intermediary ad platforms, but unfortunately at the expense
of less effective ad-targeting. As a matter of fact, the more
components of the online advertising architecture are embed-
ded on the user side, the more control the user may have
over advertising. Obviously, this would mitigate many of the
privacy risks analyzed in Sec. III.
5) RePriv: It is a proposal by Fredrikson and Livshits [66]
that aims at carrying out a selective disclosure of user data
through a browser-based tool. First, as with the extensions
described above, the proposed system would rely on the ability
of the browser to capture all the information spawned while
browsing the Web; this is the basis for local user profiling.
Next, the system contemplates that the interests derived from
such user profile are released to third-parties only if the user
gives permission. Detailed information about their browsing
habits, though, would not be released by default. Finally,
the proposed system considers additional modules that would
interface with third-party applications interested in having
access to user data.
The privacy-preserving strategy of RePriv consists in profil-
ing users locally, so that they have control over the information
that is disclosed to ad companies. However, although users
are in control of said disclosure, external entities might be
collecting such data anyway. Even though at first RePriv might
seem an interesting approach, its success in protecting user
privacy certainly depends on the disclosure control given to
users. Again, such a control may tend to be absolute (as in ad
blockers) or could be softened to balance the trade-off between
user privacy and the Web business model.
6) Privacy Badger: Much of its functionality was incor-
porated from an older project called ShareMeNot which was
originally presented in [71] by Roesner et al. Currently sup-
ported by the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), Privacy
Badger is an open-source browser extension developed for
Chrome and Firefox [63]. The extension was not conceived
as an ad blocker, but as a privacy tool that may prevent non-
consented tracking.
The operation of this browser plug-in does not rely on
blocking all tracking by default and on static filtering lists
(see Sec. IV-C on ad blockers). Instead, it capitalizes on an
algorithm to detect and then prevent non-consensual tracking
activities. Since the blocking mechanism is not based on the
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subscription to a deliberate filtering list but on rigorous algo-
rithmic methods and policies, engagements with advertising
companies to include blocking exceptions are in principle less
likely to occur.
With regard to its graphical interface, this extension looks
very similar to Disconnect and Ghostery. The user is shown
the tracking companies following their visit to a page. As
mentioned above, this tool does not block a tracker unless its
algorithm checks it is following the user without their consent.
Nevertheless, conducting this checking may take some time.
On the other hand, as with most ad blockers, users may
individually block or allow the detected trackers, or block only
the corresponding tracking cookies. Additional options include
disabling the extension on a per-site basis and manually adding
a whitelisted trackers domain.
Privacy Badger represents a promising approach to balance
the trade-off inherent in online advertising between user pri-
vacy and the Web economic model. In fact, besides blocking
non-consensual tracking, its developers offer ad companies
the opportunity to be whitelisted if they formally promise
to respect opt-out mechanisms (e.g., Do Not Track headers),
conforming with users’ privacy policies [63].
7) MyTrackingChoices: Achara et al. [68] propose a
browser extension available for Google Chrome and Mozilla
Firefox. The plug-in targets users who are not in general
against advertising and accept the trade-off that comes with
the ”free” content. However, for privacy concerns, they wish
to exert fine-grained control over tracking.
This academic proposal relies on the assumption that some
categories of web pages (e.g., related to health or religion)
are more privacy-sensitive to users than others (e.g., about
education or science). Based on this idea, the plug-in allows
users to specify the categories of web pages that are privacy-
sensitive to them and block the trackers present on such web
pages only. As tracking is prevented by blocking network con-
nections of third-party domains, MyTrackingChoices avoids
not only tracking but also third-party ads.
The detection of the tracking companies does not rely on
existing blacklists, unlike most ad blockers and anti-trackers.
Rather, MyTrackingChoices keeps a local list that is built
from the pages browsed by the user. This list is smaller and
easier to maintain than the list of tracking and advertising
domains currently used by Adblock Plus. To decide if a
third-party domain is a tracker or not, the tool checks it
is present on three or more different domains that a user
visited in the past. Since users continue receiving ads on
those web pages which belong to non-sensitive categories, this
approach may provide a better trade-off between user privacy
and the Web economy. However, this approach only provides
privacy protection against previously defined sensitive content,
when tracked through HTML cookies, and thus does not
preclude more sophisticated tracking technologies (such as
canvas fingerprinting) and less simple tracking methods based
on IP address.
8) MyAdChoices: Parra-Arnau et al. [64] propose a web-
browser plug-in aimed at bringing transparency over tracking
and advertising, and providing a certain level of granularity
with regard to blocking ads. As for transparency, the plug-
in estimates if the ads delivered to a user may have been
generated from their previously visited pages. It also permits
users to know if the browsing profiles available to trackers and
ad companies may show common or unique interests.
In terms of blocking functionalities, the tool enables users
to hide ads by topic category and depending on whether they
have been displayed based on users’ browsing interests or
not. Although the tool provides fine-grained control over ads,
it does not prevent any form of tracking; ads are basically
hidden to users by applying a black mask on top of ad images.
Another limitation of this approach is that the transparency
functionalities come at the cost of additional traffic. The reason
is due to the fact that, to decide if an ad is profile based, it
must revisit the pages browsed by the user in incognito mode.
9) AdReveal: Liu et al. [72] propose an advertising-
transparency platform aimed at studying the ads delivered to
some artificial profiles, built from the AOL search query data
set [73]. The tool is not intended for end-users, unlike MyAd-
Choices, and provides a framework that aims to study interest-
based and contextual advertising at large scale. The platform,
which operates offline and is restricted to DoubleClick ads,
analyzes two data sets to this end: the interest categories of
all ads received both in a tracked session and in an incognito-
browsing mode. The authors then use a binary classifier to
decide if an ad belonging to a certain category is interest-
based or contextual.
10) XRay: Similarly to AdReveal, XRay [74] propose a
transparency platform which tracks the personal data collected
by several Web services, and tries to correlate data inputs (e.g.,
e-mails and search queries) with data outputs (e.g., ads and
recommended links). The proposed platform has been tested
for the ads displayed on Gmail and relies on the maintenance
of a number of shadow accounts, that is, replicates of the
original account (e.g., an e-mail account), but which differ in
a subset of inputs. All these account instances are operated in
parallel by the system and are used to compare the outputs
received. Intuitively, if an ad is displayed more frequently on
those accounts sharing a certain input (e.g., an e-mail), and
this ad never shows up in the rest of shadow instances, then
this input is likely to be the cause of said ad.
The major limitations of transparency tools such as MyAd-
Choices, AdReveal and XRay, come from the necessarily
simplified model assumed for the ad-delivery process. Evaluat-
ing an ad-transparency tool is, besides, extremely challenging
since the ground truth of targeting decisions is unknown.
XRay, in addition, provide a solution which is not intended
for end-users, i.e., it is not designed to be used by a single
user who wishes to find out what particular ads are targeted
to them.
C. Industrial and Commercial Solutions
Commercial solutions mostly take the form of web-browser
extensions. Since all user interactions with the Web are han-
dled through the browser, taking advantage of such an interface
to filter or block third-party tracking seems a reasonable
approach. These browser extensions endeavor to protect user
privacy by blocking third-party interactions. This strategy is
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Protection mechanism Location Scope Protection strategy
Transparency Blocking Obfuscation Sandboxing User inclusion
Adblock Plus and
similar local local 3 3
Ghostery local local 3 3
Google Sharing third-party local 3 3
Brave N/A global
(1)
3 3 3
Subscribe2Web (2) N/A global 3(3) 3
Google
Contributor (2) N/A global 3(3) 3
Network-level ad
blocking
local,
third-party local 3 3 3
TABLE VII: Summary of the commercial solutions for privacy protection in online advertising, classified according to the parameters examined in Sec. IV-C.
(1) Its global scope feature, which allow users to get involved in the online advertising ecosystem, is still in beta version; (2) devised by Mozilla and Google,
these approaches are proposed as future products; (3) as a future project, it proposes reducing/blocking the ads displayed to users; however, it is unknown if
the approach taken will imply cutting-off Web tracking or not.
Extension Blocking strategy Trust level Expected performance
Adblock Plus List-based Medium Low
Ghostery List-based Low Medium
AdBlock List-based Medium Low
Disconnect List-based High High
Lightbeam List-based (items added manually) High Medium
Privacy Badger Heuristic-based/dynamic High Medium
DoNotTrackMe/Blur List-based Medium Medium
MyTrackingChoices Dynamic High High
MyAdChoices Dynamic High High
Brave List-based High High
TABLE VIII: Browser-based approaches described in terms of their blocking strategies, trust level and performance.
usually implemented both statically, based on lists of banned
trackers, or dynamically, based on heuristics and automatic
learning. The specific implemented approach has an immedi-
ate, evident effect on the trust level over the tool and even the
performance of the browser. For instance, those tools based on
large blocking lists (such as the ones available for the most
popular browser extensions) may perform worse due to the
need to check these lists every time a page is visited. In this
regard, we hasten to stress that the criteria employed to manage
such lists is not clear at all. This obviously may arise suspicion
and reduce the level of trust in these solutions.
A rich variety of browser-based solutions are currently
available as commercial products, some of them providing
users with control over online advertising. The controversy
stirred by the use of the blocking lists they rely on [75] [76],
however, has motivated the rise of open-source, transparency
technologies that may prevent ad companies from interfering.
Next, we shall examine a particular class of solutions called
ad blockers. Although there exist numerous tools of this
kind, our analysis will focus only on the most popular ones,
namely Adblock Plus and Ghostery. Other ad blockers such as
AbBlock [77], Lightbean [78], Disconnect [79], Blur [80], Su-
perBlock Adblocker [81], AdRemover [82], AdBlock Pro [83]
and uBlock [84] operate similarly.
The last group of (four) initiatives explored in this section
are not yet implemented and aim at radically changing the
paradigm of the online ad delivery. Sponsored by relevant
institutions such as Google, Yahoo and Internet providers,
these initiatives propose a user-driven architecture whose main
aim is to strike a better trade-off between user privacy and the
Web economic model. Table VII shows a classification of the
commercial solutions analyzed in the coming subsections on
the basis of the protection parameters described in Sec. IV-C.
(1). Table VIII shows different aspects of the browser-based
proposals (both academic and commercial) such as their
strategy to prevent tracking, and the corresponding trust level
and performance.
1) Adblock Plus: Available for all major browsers, Adblock
Plus is an extension that blocks tracking and ad serving [85]
based on filtering lists which specify the elements of a website
that may be blocked. These elements include malware do-
mains, banners, pop-up windows, and video ads on Facebook
and YouTube. Users enable blocking by adding the filtering
lists of their preference, managed in [86]. Adblock Plus is the
world’s most downloaded ad blocker and therefore the tool
that is currently threatening the Internet business model [87].
This ad blocker has recently incorporated a whitelisting
mechanism —enabled by default— for nonintrusive ads that
meet certain criteria. These criteria are defined in the accept-
able ads initiative [88], and although the adherence to this
initiative is optional for advertisers, much criticism has arisen
especially after the revelation that Adblock Plus was getting
money from ad companies to whitelist them [89], [90].
2) Ghostery: Developed by Evidon, Ghostery [91] is a
proprietary browser add-on capable of detecting third-party
trackers. By default, this tool blocks the execution of the
tracking cookies as well as the scripts belonging to the
tracking companies that are blacklisted. The list in question
is elaborated by the company itself. Even though the track-
ing companies in this list are classified into five categories,
according to their different purposes (analytics, web bugs,
privacy, advertising, and widgets), it is highly unlikely that
users recognize such categories or entities to make a conscious
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configuration of the tool [92]. However, using such lists may
simplify the configuration of the add-on.
When a user browses the Web, Ghostery shows the trackers
that are blocked on each page (through a non-intuitive or
usable categorization), and offers the possibility of adding
any such trackers to a whitelist. Ghostery protects users’
privacy from advertisers by blocking scripts, images, objects,
and documents embedded by companies the user might not
trust. Other tracking mechanisms such as web or canvas
fingerprinting are not addressed by Ghostery. Finally, the tool
has been criticized for its default behavior [92] which allows
Ghostery to collect information about the blocked ads, and
afterwards sell it to ad companies [93].
3) Google Sharing: Google Sharing [94] is a system that
provides privacy protection by avoiding the tracking conducted
by Google. It consists in a Firefox extension that redirects
user’s requests to an external proxy, where a group of identities
associated with cookies are managed. These cookies replace
the ones included in original requests, masking a user’s
identity, and are then forwarded to Google along with the
original request. Even when they allow users to send encrypted
requests, however, user privacy can still be compromised if
collusion exists between the proxy server and Google servers.
4) Brave: It is a web browser —and not a plug-in— that
natively embeds functions to block intrusive ads and third-
party tracking by default [95]. This proposal allows replacing
the ads available on the visited pages with others from Brave’s
own advertising network, claimed to be less intrusive and more
privacy-friendly.
The proposed browser contemplates integrating users into
the online advertising business by paying them 15% of the
gross ad revenue. In this regard, users are given the option to
donate such money to publishers, in exchange for an ad-free
browsing experience. Among other transparency functionali-
ties, users may learn the number and type of blocked ads, the
trackers present on the visited pages and HTTP redirections.
The upshot is that Brave operates similarly to an en-
tire ad platform, but managed by a single company. The
solution completely dispenses with the present advertising
infrastructure and aims at building a new one, apparently fairer
and more private. However, this approach has sparked much
criticism [96] since users’ browsing data are collected and
processed by a single company, which merely shift users’ trust
from the current multi-system advertising model to this new
single entity.
5) Subscribe2Web: Developed by Mozilla,
Subscribe2Web [97] endeavors to address some of the
privacy risks examined in Sec. III. Based on the idea that
online advertising is crucial for the present Web content
model, Subscribe2Web looks for a way whereby the main
actors (in particular, content creators and users) can meet
and have a natural exchange of value. Mozilla’s proposal is
to eliminate the current Web dependency on ads, in order to
fund the content creation by directly compensating content
and service providers. The aim is to provide the Web with an
API accessible from any browser through which users would
pay a monthly subscription in exchange for accessing ad-free
content.
6) Google Contributor: Contributor [98] is an initiative
supported by Google to reduce the amount of ads delivered
by its advertising services. Its main aim is not directly related
to protect user privacy but to give users the possibility to
eliminate ads from their favorite sites. Because advertisers
would be partially excluded by this approach, users registered
with this service would have to somewhat support the free ad
sites by paying a monthly fee. Thus, Contributor relies on a
novel idea where users are considered as active agents in the
Web economic model.
7) Network-Level Ad Blocking: Recently, some Internet
service providers have started to cooperate with ad companies
to implement ad blocking technologies [99] [100]. This is
the case of Three, an operator in the UK and Italy, which
is working with Shine Technologies to deploy network-based
ad blocking.
With these network-level ad blocking practices, a new
powerful agent breaks into the online advertising ecosystem,
stating that customers should have more control over the
content displayed on their browsers, especially when they
would be paying for every downloaded byte. Even though not
much information is available about the blocking mechanisms
to be used, the goal would not be to eliminate advertising but
to give users more information (transparency) and the option to
decide what to block (control). In the long term, this approach
may help protect user privacy, offer relevant and non-intrusive
ads, and allow advertisers to take upon the data charges for
downloaded ads.
V. DISCUSSION
In Secs. II and III we made it clear that online advertising
is a market where the exchanged goods are the users’ data.
Therefore, the multiple interactions among the entities of such
a market might entail privacy risks for its users. Third-party
entities from online ad platforms, such as DSPs, SSPs and
ad exchanges, and many others offering a transport channel
are especially responsible for the collection and aggregation
of most of the user information employed as the raw material
for their targeted ad delivery strategies.
The main concern of privacy advocates about online adver-
tising is that the user information collected by intermediate
entities might be employed to uniquely identify users or
classify them in order to, for instance, discriminate their
patterns of behavior. This risk is significantly worse due to the
following factors specific to the online advertising ecosystem:
• most processes are performed in the background so the
infrastructure is not transparent by default for users;
• user data is massively collected by several intermediary
entities;
• the user data are necessarily distributed and processed
at very high speeds due to the real-time requirements of
advertising, which makes it difficult for ad companies
to anonymize and protect such data right after their
collection;
• cooperation is encouraged between intermediate entities
in terms of data sharing;
17
• multiple items of information can be collected about users
through non-consented interactions that are indirectly
triggered from users;
• information about users along with processed metadata
are commonly exchanged in an unencrypted form be-
tween ad serving entities; and
• advanced, resistant and intrusive tracking mechanisms are
used to identify users online.
The inevitable consequence of the aforementioned pro-
cedures, supporting, in practice, the massive trade of user
profiles, is the abusive and nonconsensual identification and
classification of users [33] which in extreme cases might
entail, for instance, discriminative treatment [58] when they
receive online services. These factors of the online advertising
ecosystem promote the development of advanced mechanisms
to track users through the Web. Practices such as CM, flash
cookie setting, canvas fingerprinting, and device fingerprinting
in general are massively implemented [30] [47] [48] [44] and
sometimes become so intrusive that users are tracked even
when some of such fingerprints have been deleted. Most of
these practices build on cookies as a mechanism to identify
users and to even store information about them. Cookies are
commonly combined with other technologies such as canvas
and device fingerprinting to obtain a less ephemeral trace of
users. Meanwhile, CM exploits the identifying strings retrieved
by using cookies to promote massive cooperation among
online advertising entities.
The proved complexity of the online advertising ecosystem
and the generalized control that huge companies have acquired
over ad distribution infrastructures [3] [1] significantly limits
the scope of the proposed privacy protection policies. As
a consequence, most of the privacy-protecting approaches
build on local mechanisms which aim at disabling third-party
interactions triggered from the user side to online advertising
infrastructures (mainly between users and SSPs), directly
blocking user information leakage. Such local approaches
are commonly implemented as web browser extensions that
provide users with transparency and ad control functionali-
ties [85] [64]. Still located between users and SSPs, other
proposals suggest filtering strategies carried out by third-party
entities (so-called brokers) [62] [67] [61] which may have ac-
cess to the interactions directly performed between a group of
users and the advertising entities. Given the evident limitations
of local approaches, some initiatives have envisioned privacy-
by-design advertising platforms where privacy guarantees are
provided with a global scope [95] [98] [97]. Interestingly,
such initiatives agree on integrating users into the advertising
ecosystem.
Our analysis has examined privacy mechanisms with various
levels of impact on the Web. To start, offering transparency to
users is probably the most appreciated feature of ad blockers
(and research platforms such as AdReveal), which is com-
plemented with tracking blocking capabilities to give users a
significant level of control. Notwithstanding, the usability of
ad blockers for nontechnical users is questionable [92] and
these approaches dismiss much, if not all, the current online
advertising ecosystem, thus hindering the current economic
model of the Web supported by ads.
Even though some of these blocking-based solutions have
become pretty popular (e.g., Adblock Plus), the changing
business models and default (whitelisting) behaviors of some
of these commercial solutions have stirred great controversy.
Fortunately, other approaches supported by privacy activists,
academics and foundations (such as EFF) are proposing
more adequate and usable technologies (e.g., Privacy Bad-
ger, MyTrackingChoices) that may block tracking according
to users’ preferences [63] [64]. Other more refined vari-
ants of this blocking strategy are obfuscation and sandbox-
ing [35] [67] [69] [66] (proposed by Obliviad, AdJail, Privad,
Adnostic, RePriv and Ghostery). The ultimate aim of these
mechanisms is also bounding the amount of user information
learned by ad platforms, while striving to adapt to the current
advertising business paradigm. As for the privacy threats posed
by the structure and capabilities of online advertising, by
blocking third-party tracking most commercial solutions claim
to hamper cookie setting and thus CM. Canvas fingerprinting
can be blocked by most local solutions, yet only on a per-
domain basis, the same way as flash cookies. Remarkably,
combining at least two ad blockers should offer enough
protection against most of the threats described in Sec. III.
Finally, given the dynamic nature of user and ad platform
economic incentives [101] [102] with respect to privacy, it
seems reasonable to propose new and more private ad distri-
bution (and economic) models. Undoubtedly, this should be
with the help of mechanisms that allows users to play a more
active role on deciding whether to be tracked or not [95] [97].
Inevitably, this level of control would imply an important
reduction in revenue for publishers, and thus require users to
directly pay content creators.
Since online privacy may be measured with respect to
the interest of Web users to protect their browsing data and
that of adversaries to exploit such information, analyzing the
respective motivations of the different actors is also of great
interest.
Without a doubt, economic incentives have encouraged
intermediary entities, advertisers, publishers, and users to
participate (consciously or not) in online advertising. Users’
unconscious motivation to get involved in online advertising,
playing the role of the product, is linked to their need to
access free content and services on the Internet. Since the
vast majority of Web content and services is paid from
advertisement revenue, users have few options to opt-out.
On the other hand, publishers need to help advertisers and
ad platforms in their bid to maximize their revenue. For
this purpose, website owners are disposed to cede valuable
space in their sites and information about their users to such
intermediary parties, which thereafter will be responsible for
deploying ad-delivery mechanisms. Thus, in exchange for
money, publishers surrender some control of its interaction
with users and indirectly participate in the disclosure of private
contextual information to ad platforms.
On the other side, the interest of advertisers in actively
leaking user information is rather reduced, unless several of
them collude to share. However, advertisers typically engage
ad exchanges and DSPs’ services to receive contextual infor-
mation, which may be useful to deliver targeted ads. Therefore,
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Observations
ObliviAd 3
Obfuscating user preferences may prevent third-
party tracking. But IP address, user agents and
other content embedded in websites might still be
used as sources of fingerprinting
AdJail N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Provides security services such as integrity andconfidentiality in the publisher side
Privad 3
May avoid third-party tracking, but other user data
such IP address and certain user agent may be used
as sources of fingerprinting
Adnostic 3 3 3
If enforced by ad platforms, it would discourage
third-party tracking. Protection against other threats
is not considered
RePriv N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 3 3 Users may control their browsing data on their side,but nothing may prevent external tracking
Privacy Badger 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Blocks most tracking mechanisms, but little controlis given to users
MyTrackingChoices 3 3 3 3 3
Users may block third-party tracking on a more
granular level, but protection is against previously
defined sensitive content
MyAdChoices 3 3 3 Does not prevent any form of tracking, and ads arehidden from the user, not blocked
AdReveal 3 Framework aimed at studying interest-based andcontextual advertising at large scale
XRay 3 Platform, not intended for end users
TABLE IX: Online advertising privacy threats and academic proposals addressing them. (1) Since this threat derives directly from interactions explicitly
triggered by users, protecting from it is a challenging task.
advertisers’ incentives to collect user information are high as
well.
The commercial nature of online advertising has spurred a
debate about the motivation of the involved entities to protect
privacy and to profit from user data. Although apparently
opposed, the motivations of users and advertising interme-
diaries for privacy might vary according to factors that are
not commonly considered. Research on the economic behavior
of data holders in the market of online advertising [103] has
shown that an increased level of user-targeting can reduce their
profit due to an exacerbated transfer of value to advertisers.
Specifically, advertisers would be gradually less interested in
bidding for user impressions as more detailed information is
given to them. That way, according to Bergemann and Bonatti
[102], an unexpected incentive may appear for data holders to
provide reduced accuracy in the exchanged user data, with the
aim of generating greater demand from advertisers and thus
greater profit for data holders. Interestingly, such increase in
profit may lead to more privacy for users (given by the reduced
precision of user data leaked to advertisers). Nonetheless, a
recent study by Taylor and Wagman [104] poses that the
effects of targeting capabilities on profits depend on market
and is, consequently, given by context.
Users seem to face a similar contextual dichotomy even
though the concern about privacy is generalized [105] [106].
The fact is that the creation of a marketplace in personal
data may shift the balance of power between individuals and
companies that gather data. According to some recent studies,
this is a shift people would be willing to embrace. Just over
half of the 9 000 people surveyed worldwide said they would
share data about themselves with companies in exchange for
cash [107]. A separate survey has found that 42 percent of
more than a thousand 13-17-year-olds in the U.K would rather
accept cash for their personal data than earn money from a
job [108]. Lastly, it was reported in [109] that 56 percent of
the consumers surveyed would be willing to give up personal
data provided that they received some kind of economic
compensation. This dichotomy between users’ concerns and
intentions regarding privacy might obey, according to Acquisiti
et al. [101], to multidimensional factors relative to the context
where the user operates, such as their lack of awareness
about privacy risks, and cognitive and behavioral biases. The
upshot is that users’ assessment of their own privacy will
strictly shape the impact of external threats. Tables IX and X
summarize our discussion of privacy technologies and how
they may address the threats identified in Sec. III.
A. Future Research Directions
The complexity of online advertising poses various challenges
to user privacy. From the analysis conducted in the previous
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AdBlock Plus 3 3 3 3 3 3
Protects against some of the analyzed privacy
threats, but threatens the economic model of the
Web
Ghostery 3 3 3 3 3 3 Offers additional transparency functionalities tousers regarding third-party tracking
Google Sharing 3 3 Aimed at protecting users only from cookie track-ing performed by Google
Brave 3 3 (5) 3 3 3 3 3
Based on the paradigm of a more user-driven ad
platform; offers transparency and a great level of
control to users
Subscribe2Web N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Posits a future ad-free Web, but it is unknown if this
commercial solution necessarily implies stopping
tracking users
Google Contributor N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Proposes an alternative economic model for the
Web, but it is not clear if users will support content
creators economically
Network-level ad
blocking 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
At network level, Internet providers are capable of
offering similar blocking services than those of ad
blockers
TABLE X: Online advertising privacy threats and commercial solutions addressing them. (1) Since this threat derives directly from interactions explicitly
triggered by users, protecting from it is a challenging task; (2) most solutions only show the number of trackers detected/blocked; (3) control is commonly
enforced by given users blocking capabilities; (4) default configurations simplify their use but at the expense of privacy; (5) fingerprinting protection is
currently in beta version.
sections, we envisage two main lines of future research:
identifying new privacy threats and providing new protection
mechanisms. Given the opacity of ad platforms, we believe
that further exploring the tracking capabilities of the adver-
tising industry will help discover their potential to become
privacy attackers. But not only that, unveiling the user data
exchange processes within ad platforms would expose the
extent to which some of their intermediate entities are prone
to become massive surveillance agents. A better knowledge of
the adversary will contribute to develop protection mechanisms
which are more tailored to the above mentioned privacy
threats.
As for privacy mechanisms, a natural next step would
be combining some of the proposals described in Sec. IV.
Such synergy shall generate more robust and useful privacy
solutions for detecting user-related flaws and invasive tracking
behaviors, and better adapting privacy enhancing technologies
to the current Web economic model.
Regarding the strategy posed by current privacy protection
approaches (namely blocking, obfuscation, sandboxing, and
user inclusion), a further analysis on their impact on the Web
economic model will reveal if such proposals are effectively
adapting to the current advertising business model, without a
significant side effect.
A further research direction for improving users’ privacy in
online advertising is to create smarter protection tools in the
user side, that is, developed as browser complements. Intel-
ligibility, usability and flexibility are some of the parameters
that need to be considered to enable mechanisms to give users
real transparency and control over their browsing data. In this
regard, a great deal of work has to be done to develop tools that
let users effectively enforce their motivations on the protection
strategy selected.
Another strand of research may consider the scope of the
protection strategy, currently limited to the user side. Extend-
ing the scope of the privacy protection mechanisms to the
different players (e.g., publishers, advertisers, ad exchanges)
might result in a more solid approach. Accordingly, analyzing
and evaluating the privacy policies and protection mechanisms
offered by ad platforms might contribute to detect their flaws
and make improvements.
To go beyond the simplistic (and endangering) blocking
strategy of some approaches examined in Sec. IV, new adver-
tising models have to be envisioned that provide flexible two-
way communication interfaces between users and ad platforms
through which they could directly manage their relationship
according to their interests. While economic interests of ad-
vertising entities are widely known, user motivations related
to privacy, advertising choices and even economic incentives
should be seriously considered by such models. Undoubtedly,
more transparent and balanced interactions will derive in an
increased sense of security and thus of privacy.
A more user-driven advertising platform, where user inter-
ests regarding their privacy and profit may be variable (not
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always opposing to the advertisers’), and the assessment of
user information as an asset with intrinsic economic value, not
only for intermediate advertising entities, but also for users,
will help to study the trade-off between such value and the
privacy of users involved in online advertising transactions.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Online advertising has become ubiquitous on the Internet and
the revenues ad serving generates for publishers are supporting
the existing free Internet access model. As a consequence of
such ubiquity, online advertising has triggered the creation of
a massive transport channel whose intermediary components
have access to billions of users and, in particular, to their
data. Even though gigabytes of aggregated user data support
more targeted advertising campaigns, the inherent lack of
transparency of online advertising entails serious risks to user
privacy. In this article, by breaking down the instances of
online advertising platforms and their corresponding capa-
bilities (regarding user data), we have outlined an attacker
model to describe the potential hazards to user privacy. We
have emphasized the variety of information subject to be
collected, the large number of intermediaries involved, their
advanced and intrusive tracking capabilities, and the impact
of advertising practices on privacy.
Unlike what happens with other online privacy threats, there
is little users can do to completely prevent risks coupled with
online advertising. Nevertheless, several solutions are offered
to help protect the privacy of users within such an opaque
ecosystem. Accordingly, we have offered a wide range of
mechanisms in this paper and we classified them into local
solutions (browser and third-party based) and proposals based
on new ad serving paradigms. On the one hand, some of the
local solutions are very popular and their blocking approaches
are already negatively impacting the economic model of online
advertising. On the other hand, new advertising models are
arising to offer native privacy and a stronger role for the
user, while still proposing radical variations of the current
advertising logic.
In addition, we have elaborated on the pros and cons
of some of the aforementioned protection mechanisms with
regard to the threats they try to alleviate within online adver-
tising platforms. In such analysis, we also outlined dynamic
and smarter approaches proposed to avoid radical blocking
mechanisms. Yet, based on the proposals analyzed, we have
found it very hard to provide more privacy in the online
advertising ecosystem without significantly modifying the ad
delivery model to give users more control and to reduce the
financial dependence of Internet content on advertising.
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